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The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from 
research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer 
concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations 
call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant 
evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the 
Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting that one’s environment 
can influence one’s psychological states, as well as recent work on inducing illusions of 
embodiment. Then, in Section “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect,” we go 
on to discuss recent evidence indicating that immersion in VR can have psychological 
effects that last after leaving the virtual environment. In the second part of the article, we 
turn to the risks and recommendations. We begin, in Section “The Research Ethics of 
VR,” with the research ethics of VR, covering six main topics: the limits of experimental 
environments, informed consent, clinical risks, dual-use, online research, and a general 
point about the limitations of a code of conduct for research. Then, in Section “Risks for 
Individuals and Society,” we turn to the risks of VR for the general public, covering four 
main topics: long-term immersion, neglect of the social and physical environment, risky 
content, and privacy. We offer concrete recommendations for each of these 10 topics, 
summarized in Table 1.
Keywords: ethics, virtual reality, augmented reality, substitutional reality, depersonalization disorder, derealization, 
informed consent, dual use
PReLiMiNARY ReMARKS
Media reports indicate that virtual reality (VR) headsets will be commercially available in early 2016, 
or shortly thereafter, with offerings from, for example, Facebook (Oculus), HTC and Valve (Vive) 
Microsoft (HoloLens), and Sony (Morpheus). There has been a good bit of attention devoted to the 
exciting possibilities that this new technology and the research behind it have to offer, but there has 
been less attention devoted to novel ethical issues or the risks and dangers that are foreseeable with the 
widespread use of VR. Here, we wish to list some of the ethical issues, present a first, non-exhaustive 
list of those risks, and offer concrete recommendations for minimizing them. Of course, all this takes 
place in a wider sociocultural context: VR is a technology, and technologies change the objective 
world. Objective changes are subjectively perceived, and may lead to correlated shifts in value judg-
ments. VR technology will eventually change not only our general image of humanity but also our 
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understanding of deeply entrenched notions, such as “conscious 
experience,” “selfhood,” “authenticity,” or “realness.” In addition, 
it will transform the structure of our life-world, bringing about 
entirely novel forms of everyday social interactions and changing 
the very relationship we have to our own minds. In short, there 
will be a complex and dynamic interaction between “normality” 
(in the descriptive sense) and “normalization” (in the normative 
sense), and it is hard to predict where the overall process will lead 
us (Metzinger and Hildt, 2011).
Before beginning, we should quickly situate this article within 
the larger field of the philosophy of technology. Brey (2010) has 
offered a helpful taxonomy dividing the philosophy of technol-
ogy into the classical works from the mid-twentieth century, 
on the one hand, and more recent developments that follow an 
“empirical turn” by focusing on the nature of particular emerging 
technologies, on the other hand. We intend the present article to 
be a contribution to the latter kind of philosophy of technology. In 
particular, we are investigating foundational issues in the applied 
ethics of VR, with a heavy emphasis on recent empirical results. 
Both authors have been participants in the collaborative project 
Virtual Embodiment and Robotic Re-Embodiment (VERE), a 
5-year research program funded by the European Commission.1 
Despite this explicit focus, we do not mean to imply that the 
issues investigated here will not find fruitful application to themes 
from classical twentieth century philosophy of technology (see 
Franssen et al., 2009). Consider, for instance, Martin Heidegger’s 
influential treatment of the way in which modern technology 
distorts our metaphysics of the natural world (Heidegger, 1977; 
also Borgmann, 1984), or Herbert Marcuse’s prescient account 
of industrial society’s ongoing creation of false needs that under-
mine our capacities for individuality (Marcuse, 1964). As should 
become clear from the examples below, immersive VR introduces 
new and dramatic ways of disrupting our relationship to the natu-
ral world (see Neglect of Others and the Physical Environment). 
Likewise, the newly created “need” to interact using social media 
will become even more psychologically ingrained as the interac-
tions begin to take place while we are embodied in virtual spaces 
(see The Effects of Long-Term Immersion and O’Brolcháin et al., 
2016). In sum, the fact that connections with classical philosophy 
of technology will remain largely implicit in this article should 
not be taken to suggest that they are not of great importance.
The main focus will be on immersive VR, in which subjects 
use a head-mounted display (HMD) to create the feeling of being 
within a virtual environment. Although our main topic involves 
the experience of immersion, some of the concerns raised, such 
as neglect of the physical environment (see Neglect of Others and 
the Physical Environment), can be applied to extended use of an 
HMD even when users do not experience immersion such as 
1 The project, as well as the current publication, is funded under the EU 7th 
Framework Program, Future and Emerging Technologies (Grant 257695). VERE 
aimed at dissolving the boundary between the human body and surrogate represen-
tations in immersive virtual reality and physical reality, giving people the illusion 
that their surrogate representation is their own body. See http://www.vereproject.
eu/ for more. We thank members of the VERE consortium for discussing many of 
the issues in this article during our VERE Ethics Workshops in February 2013 and 
September 2015.
when merely using the device for 3D viewing. Many of our points 
are also relevant for other types of VR hardware, such as CAVE 
projection. One central area of concern has to do with illusions of 
embodiment, in which one has the feeling of being embodied other 
than in one’s actual physical body (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; 
Slater et al., 2010). In VR, for instance, one might have the illusion 
of being embodied in an avatar that looks just like one’s physical 
body. Or one might have the illusion of being embodied in an 
avatar of a different size, age, or skin color. In all of these cases, 
insight into the illusory nature of the overall state is preserved. 
The fact that VR technology can induce illusions of embodiment 
is one of the main motivations behind our investigation into the 
new risks generated by using VR by researchers and by the general 
public. Traditional paradigms in experimental psychology cannot 
induce these strong illusions. Similarly, watching a film or playing 
a non-immersive video game cannot create the strong illusion of 
owning and controlling a body that is not your own. Although 
our main focus will be on VR (see Figure 1), many of the risks and 
recommendations can be extended to augmented reality (Azuma, 
1997; Metz, 2012; Huang et  al., 2013 and substitutional reality 
(Suzuki et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2013). In augmented reality (AR, 
see Figure 2), one experiences virtual elements intermixed with 
one’s actual physical environment.
Following Milgram and colleagues (Milgram and Kishino, 
1994; Milgram and Colquhoun, 1999), it may be helpful here 
to consider augmented reality along the Reality–Virtuality 
Continuum. The real environment is located at one extreme of 
the continuum and an entirely virtual environment is located at 
the other extreme. Displays can be placed along the continuum 
according to whether they primarily represent the real environ-
ment while including some virtual elements (augmented reality) 
or they primarily represent a virtual environment while including 
some real elements (augmented virtuality). Much of the following 
discussion will focus on entirely virtual environments, but readers 
should keep in mind that many of the concerns raised will also 
apply to environments all along the Reality–Virtuality Continuum.
It is foreseeable that there will be ever new extensions and 
special cases of VR. We return to this theme with some philo-
sophical remarks at the end of the article. For now, let us at least 
note that the very distinction between the real and the virtual is 
ripe for further philosophical investigation. One example of such 
a special, recent extension of VR that does not in itself form a 
distinct new category is “substitutional reality” (SR, see Figure 3), 
in which an omni-directional video feed gives one the illusion of 
being in a different location in space and/or time, and insight may 
not be preserved. Readers should keep in mind that VR headsets 
will likely enable users to toggle between virtual, augmented, and 
substitutional reality, and to adjust one’s location on the Reality–
Virtuality Continuum, thus somewhat blurring the boundaries 
between kinds of immersive environments.
We divide our discussion into two main areas. First, we will 
address the research ethics of VR. Then we will turn to issues aris-
ing with the use of VR by the general public for entertainment and 
other purposes. To be clear upfront, we are not calling for general 
restrictions on an individual’s liberty to spend time (and money) 
in VR. In open democratic societies, such regulations must be 
based on rational arguments and available empirical evidence, 
FiGURe 2 | An augmented reality hand illusion. Here, augmented reality is used to show the subject a virtual hand in a biologically realistic location relative to his 
own body. This case differs from virtual reality due to the fact that the subject sees the virtual hand embedded in his own physical environment rather than in an 
entirely virtual environment (image used with kind permission from Keisuke Suzuki).
FiGURe 1 | illusory ownership of an avatar in virtual reality. Here, a subject is shown wearing a head-mounted display and a body tracking suit. The subject can see 
his avatar in VR moving in synchrony with his own movements in a virtual mirror. In this case, the avatar is designed to replicate Sigmund Freud in order to enable subjects 
to counsel themselves. Thus, creating what Freud may have called an instance of avatar-introjection! (Image used with kind permission from Osimo et al., 2015.)
FiGURe 3 | immersion in the past using substitutional reality. In this example, substitutional reality is used to allow switching between a live view of the scene 
and a panoramic recording of that scene from the past. Note that SR could also be used to provide live (or recorded) panoramic input from a distant location, 
creating the illusion that one is “present” somewhere else (image used with kind permission from Anil Seth).
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and they should be guided by a general principle of liberalism: 
in principle, the individual citizen’s freedom and autonomy in 
dealing with their own brain and in choosing their own desired 
states of mind (including all of their phenomenal and cognitive 
properties) should be maximized. As a matter of fact, we would 
even argue for a constitutional right to mental self-determination 
(Bublitz and Merkel, 2014), somewhat limiting the authority 
of the government, because the above-mentioned values of 
individual freedom and mental autonomy seem to be absolutely 
fundamental to the idea of a liberal democracy involving a 
separation of powers. However, once such a general principle has 
been clearly stated, the much more interesting and demanding 
task lies in helping individuals exercise this freedom in an intel-
ligent way, in order to minimize potential adverse effects and the 
overall psychosocial cost to society as a whole (Metzinger, 2009a; 
Metzinger and Hildt, 2011). New technologies like VR open a vast 
space of potential actions. This space has to be constrained in a 
rational and evidence-based manner.
Similarly, we fully support ongoing research using VR – indeed, 
we argue below that there are ethical demands to do more 
research using it, research that is motivated in part with the goal 
of mitigating harm for the general public. But we do think that it 
is prudent to anticipate risks and we wish to spread awareness of 
how possibly to avoid, or at least minimize, those risks.2 Before 
entering into the concrete details, we are going to make the case 
for being especially concerned about VR technology in contrast, 
say, to television or non-immersive video games. We do so in 
two steps. First, in Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we 
cover some of the relevant discoveries from psychology in the 
past decades, including the scientific foundation for illusions of 
embodiment. Then in Section “Illusions of Embodiment and 
Their Lasting Effect,” we cover the more recent experimental 
work that has begun to reveal the lasting psychological effects of 
these illusions. Then in Section “Recommendations for the Use 
of VR by Researchers and Consumers,” we will cover the research 
ethics of VR followed by risks for the general public.
Plasticity in the Human Mind
One central result of modern experimental psychology is that 
human behavior can be strongly influenced by external factors 
while the agent is totally unaware of this influence. Behavior is 
context sensitive and the mind is plastic, which is to say that 
it is capable of being continuously shaped and re-shaped by a 
host of causal factors. These results, some of which we present 
below, suggest that our environment, including technology and 
other humans, has an unconscious influence on our behavior. 
Note that the results do not conflict with the manifest fact that 
most of us have relatively stable character traits over time. After 
all, most of us spend our time in relatively stable environments. 
And there may be many aspects of the functional architecture 
2 Behr et  al. (2005) have addressed similar themes about practical issues in VR 
research and applications. Here, we wish to address concerns that go beyond their 
initial treatment of the topic. More recently, O’Brolcháin et al. (2016) have covered 
ways in which the conjunction of VR with social networks might raise threats 
to privacy and autonomy. We will engage with some of their concerns at various 
points below.
underlying the neurally realized part of the human self-model 
[for example, of the body model in our brain, e.g., Metzinger 
(2003), p. 355] that are largely genetically determined. However, 
we also want to point out that human beings possess a large 
number of epigenetic traits, that is, a stably heritable phenotype 
resulting from changes in a chromosome without alterations in 
the DNA sequence.
Context-Sensitivity All the Way Down
The way in which our behavior is sensitive to environmental 
features is especially relevant here due to the fact that VR intro-
duces a completely new type of environment, a new cognitive and 
cultural niche, which we are now constructing for ourselves as a 
species.
It is not excluded that extended interactions with VR 
environments may lead to more fundamental changes, 
not only on a psychological, but also on a biological level.
Some of the most famous experiments in psychology reveal 
the context sensitivity of human behavior. These include the 
Stanford Prison Experiment, in which normal subjects playing 
roles as either prison guards or inmates began to show patho-
logical behavioral traits (Haney et al., 1973), Milgram’s obedi-
ence experiments, in which subjects obeyed orders that they 
believed to cause serious pain and be immoral (Milgram, 1974), 
and Asch’s conformity experiments, in which subjects gave obvi-
ously incorrect answers to questions after hearing confederates, 
all give the same incorrect answers (Asch, 1951). For a more 
recent result showing the unconscious impact of environment 
on behavior, the amount of money placed in a collection box 
for drinks in a university break room was measured under a 
condition in which the image of a pair of eyes was posted above 
the collection box. With the eyes “watching,” coffee drinkers 
placed three times as much money in the box compared to the 
control condition with no eyes (Bateson et  al., 2006). Effects 
like this one may be particularly relevant in VR, because the 
subjective experience of presence and being there is not only 
determined by functional factors like the number and fidelity 
of sensory input and output channels, the ability to modify the 
virtual environment, but also, importantly, the level of social 
interactivity, for example, in terms of actually being recognized 
as an existing person by others in the virtual world (Heeter, 1992; 
Metzinger, 2003). As investigations into VR have interestingly 
shown, a phenomenal reality as such becomes more real  –  in 
terms of the subjective experience of presence – as more agents 
recognizing one and interacting with one are contained in this 
reality. Phenomenologically, ongoing social cognition enhances 
both this reality and the self in their degree of “realness.” This 
principle will also hold if the subjective experience of ongoing 
social cognition is of a hallucinatory nature.
Potential for Deep Behavioral Manipulation
Whether physical or virtual, human behavior is situated and 
socially contextualized, and we are often unaware of the causal 
impact this fact has on learning mechanisms as well as on 
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occurrent behavior. It is plausible to assume that this will be true 
of novel media environments as well. Importantly, unlike other 
forms of media, VR can create a situation in which the user’s entire 
environment is determined by the creators of the virtual world, 
including “social hallucinations” induced by advanced avatar 
technology. Unlike physical environments, virtual environments 
can be modified quickly and easily with the goal of influencing 
behavior.
The comprehensive character of VR plus the potential 
for the global control of experiential content introduces 
opportunities for new and especially powerful forms of 
both mental and behavioral manipulation, especially 
when commercial, political, religious, or governmental 
interests are behind the creation and maintenance of the 
virtual worlds.
However, the plasticity of the mind is not limited to behavioral 
traits. Illusions of embodiment are possible because the mind is 
plastic to such a degree that it can misrepresent its own embodi-
ment. To be clear, illusions of embodiment can arise from normal 
brain activity alone, and need not imply changes in underlying 
neural structure. Such illusions occur naturally in dreams, 
phantom limb experiences, out-of-body experiences, and Body 
Integrity Identity Disorder (Brugger et  al., 2000; Metzinger, 
2009b; Hilti et  al., 2013; Ananthaswamy, 2015; Windt, 2015), 
and they sometimes include a shift in what has been termed the 
phenomenal “unit of identification” in consciousness research 
(UI; Metzinger, 2013a,b), the conscious content that we currently 
experience as “ourselves” (please note that in the current paper 
“UI” does not refer to “user interface,” but always to the specific 
experiential content of “selfhood,” as explained below). This may 
be the deepest theoretical reason why we should be cautious 
about the psychological effects of applied VR: this technology 
is unique in beginning to target and manipulate the UI in our 
brain itself.
Direct UI-Manipulation
The UI is the form of experiential content that gives rise to 
autophenomenological reports of the type “I am this!” For 
every self-conscious system, there exists a phenomenal unit of 
identification, such that the system possesses a single, conscious 
model of reality; the UI is a part of this model; at any given 
point in time, the UI can be characterized by a specific and 
determinate representational content, which in turn constitutes 
the system’s phenomenal self-model (PSM, Metzinger, 2003) at 
t. Please note how the UI does not have to be identical with 
the content of the conscious body image or a region within it 
(like a fictitious point behind the eyes). For example, the UI 
can be moved out of and behind the head as phenomenally 
experienced in a repeatable and controllable fashion by direct 
electrical stimulation while preserving the visual first-person 
perspective with its origin behind the eyes (de Ridder et  al., 
2007). For human beings, the UI is dynamic and can be highly 
variable. There exists a minimal UI, which likely is constituted 
by pure spatiotemporal self-location (Blanke and Metzinger, 
2009; Windt, 2010; Metzinger, 2013a,b); and in some configura-
tions (e.g., “being one with the world”), there is also a maximal 
UI, likely constituted by the most general phenomenal property 
available, namely, the integrated nature of phenomenality per se 
(Metzinger, 2013a,b).
VR technology directly targets the mechanism by which 
human beings phenomenologically identify with the 
content of their self-model.
The rubber hand illusion is a simple localized illusion of 
embodiment that can be induced by having subjects look 
at a visually realistic rubber hand in a biologically realistic 
position (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 
2005). When the rubber hand is stroked synchronously with 
the subject’s physical hand (which is hidden from view), 
subjects experience the rubber hand as their own.3 While the 
rubber hand can be used to create a partial illusion of embodi-
ment, the same basic idea can be used to create the full-body 
illusion, on a global level. Subjects look through goggles 
through which they see a live video feed of their own bodies 
(or of a virtual body) located a short distance in front of their 
actual location. When they see their bodies being stroked on 
the back, and feel themselves being stroked at the same time, 
subjects sometimes feel as if the body that they see in front of 
them is their own (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; see Figure 4). 
This illusion is much weaker and more fragile than the RHI, 
but it has given us valuable new insights into the bottom-up 
construction of our conscious, bodily self-model in the brain 
(Metzinger, 2014). In more recent work, Maselli and Slater 
(2013) have found that tactile feedback is not required for an 
illusion of embodiment. They found that a virtual arm with a 
realistic appearance co-located with the subject’s actual arm 
is sufficient to induce the illusion of ownership of the virtual 
arm. In addition to visual and tactile signals, recent work 
suggests that manipulations of interoceptive signals, such as 
heartbeat, can also influence our experience of embodiment 
(Aspell et al., 2013; Seth, 2013).
The results sketched in these three sections reveal not only 
categories of risks but also three ways in which the human mind 
is plastic. First, there is “context-sensitivity all the way down,” 
which may involve hitherto unknown kinds of epigenetic trait 
formation in new environments. Second, there is evidence that 
behavior can be strongly influenced by environment and context, 
and in a deep way. Third, illusions of embodiment can be induced 
fairly easily in the laboratory, directly targeting the human UI 
itself. These results can be taken together as empirical premises 
for an argument stating not only that there may be unexpected 
psychological risks if illusions of embodiment are misused, 
or used recklessly, but that, if we are interested in minimizing 
potential damage and future psychosocial costs, these risks are 
themselves ethically relevant. In the following section, we review 
initial evidence that connects the three strands of evidence that 
3 For a version of this illusion using a virtual hand in augmented reality (rather than 
a rubber hand), see Figure 2 above.
FiGURe 4 | Creating a whole-body analog of the rubber-hand illusion. (A) Participant (dark blue trousers) sees through a HMD his own virtual body (light blue 
trousers) in 3D, standing 2 m in front of him and being stroked synchronously or asynchronously at the participant’s back. In other conditions, the participant sees 
either (B) a virtual fake body (light red trousers) or (C) a virtual non-corporeal object (light gray) being stroked synchronously or asynchronously at the back. Dark 
colors indicate the actual location of the physical body or object, whereas light colors represent the virtual body or object seen on the HMD. (Image used with kind 
permission from M. Boyer.).
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we have just presented. That is, we review initial evidence that 
illusions of embodiment can be combined with a change in envi-
ronment and context in order to bring about lasting psychological 
effects in subjects.
illusions of embodiment and Their  
Lasting effect
In the last several years, a number of studies have found a 
psychological influence on subjects while immersed in a virtual 
environment. These studies suggest that VR poses risks that 
are novel, that go beyond the risks of traditional psychological 
experiments in isolated environments, and that go beyond the 
risks of existing media technology for the general public. A first 
important result from VR research involves what is known as 
the virtual pit (Meehan et al., 2002). Subjects are given a HMD 
that immerses them in a virtual environment in which they are 
standing at the edge of a deep pit. In one kind of experiment 
involving the pit, they are instructed to lean over the edge and 
drop a beanbag onto a target at the bottom. In order to enhance 
the illusion of standing at the edge, the subject stands on the ledge 
of a wooden platform in the lab that is only 1.5″ from the ground. 
Despite their belief that they were in no danger because the pit was 
“only” virtual, subjects nonetheless show increased signs of stress 
through increases in heart rate and skin conductance (ibid.). In a 
February 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 37
Madary and Metzinger Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org
variation of the virtual pit, subjects may be told to walk across the 
pit over a virtual beam. In the lab, a real wooden beam is placed 
where subjects see the virtual beam. As one might expect, this 
version of the pit also elicits strong feelings of stress and fear.4 
More recently, an experiment reproducing the famous Milgram 
obedience experiments in VR found that subjects reacted as if the 
shocks they administered were real, despite believing that they 
were merely virtual (Slater et al., 2006).
In addition to a strong emotional response from immersion, 
there is evidence that experiences in VR can also influence 
behavioral responses. One example of a behavioral influence 
from VR has been named the Proteus Effect by Nick Yee and 
Jeremy Bailenson. This effect occurs when subjects “conform 
to the behavior that they believe others would expect them to 
have” based on the appearance of their avatar (Yee and Bailenson, 
2007, p. 274; Kilteni et al., 2013). They found, for example, that 
subjects embodied in a taller avatar negotiated more aggressively 
than subjects in a shorter avatar (ibid.). Changes in behavior 
while in the virtual environment are of ethical concern, since 
such behavior can have serious implications for our non-virtual 
physical lives – for example, as financial transactions take place 
in a non-physical environment (Madary, 2014).
But perhaps even more concerning for our purposes is evi-
dence that behavior while in the virtual environment can have a 
lasting psychological impact after subjects return to the physical 
world. Hershfield et al. (2011) found that subjects embodying 
avatars that look like aged versions of themselves show a ten-
dency to allocate more money for their retirement after leaving 
the virtual environment. Rosenberg et al. (2013) had subjects 
perform tasks in a virtual city. Subjects were allowed to fly 
through the city either using a helicopter or by their own body 
movements, like Superman. They found that subjects given 
the superpower were more likely to show altruistic behavior 
afterwards – they were more likely to help an experimenter pick 
up spilled pens. Yoon and Vargas (2014) found a similar result, 
although not using fully immersive VR. They had subjects play 
a video game as either a superhero, a supervillain, or a neutral 
control avatar. After playing the game, subjects were given a 
tasting task that they were told was unrelated to the gaming 
experiment. Subjects were given either chocolate or chili sauce 
to taste, and then told to measure out the amount of food for the 
subsequent subject to taste. Those who played as heroes poured 
out more chocolate, while those who played as villains poured 
out more chili.
The psychological impact of immersive VR has also been 
explored in a beneficent application. Peck et al. (2013) gave sub-
jects an implicit racial bias test at least 3 days before immersion 
and then immediately after the immersion. In the experiment, 
subjects were embodied in an avatar with either light skin, dark 
skin, purple skin, or they were immersed in the virtual world with 
no body. They found that subjects who were embodied in the 
dark-skinned avatar showed a decrease in implicit racial bias, at 
least temporarily.
4 For some nice anecdotal accounts of experiences with the virtual pit, see Blascovich 
and Bailenson, 2011: 38-42.
ReCOMMeNDATiONS FOR THe USe OF 
vR BY ReSeARCHeRS AND CONSUMeRS
With the results from the first section of the paper in mind as 
illustrative examples, we now move on to make concrete recom-
mendations for VR in both scientific research (see The Research 
Ethics of VR) and consumer applications (see Risks for Individuals 
and Society). Our main recommendations are italicized and listed 
together in Table 1.
The Research ethics of vR
In this section, we cover questions about the ethics of conducting 
research either on VR, or, perhaps more interestingly, research 
using VR as a tool. For example, it is plausible to assume that in 
the future there will be many experiments combining real-time 
fMRI and VR or ones using animal subjects in VR (Normand 
et al., 2012), which are not only about understanding or improv-
ing VR itself but only use it a research tool. To begin with a short 
example, Behr et al. (2005) have covered the research ethics of VR 
from a practical perspective, emphasizing that the risk of motion 
sickness must be minimized and that researchers ought to assist 
subjects as they leave the virtual environment and readjust to the 
real world. In this part of the article, we indicate new issues in the 
research ethics of VR that were not covered in Behr et al.’s initial 
treatment. In particular, we will raise the following six issues:
• the limits of experimental environments,
• informed consent with regard to the lasting psychological 
effects of VR,
• risks associated with clinical applications of VR,
• the possibility of using results of VR research for malicious 
purposes (dual use),
• online research using VR, and
• a general point about the inherent limitations of a code of 
conduct for research.
For each of these issues, we offer concrete recommendations 
for researchers using VR as well as ethics committees charged 
with evaluating the permissibility of particular experimental 
paradigms using VR.
Ethical Experimentation
What are the limits to what we can do ethically as experiments in 
VR? We recommend, at the very least, that researchers ought to 
follow the principle of non-maleficence: do no harm. This princi-
ple is a central component of research ethics on human subjects 
where it is often discussed with the accompanying principle of 
beneficence: maximize well-being for the subjects. Note how such 
a principle applies to all sentient beings capable of suffering, like 
non-human animals or even potential artificial subjects of experi-
ence in the future (Althaus et  al., 2015, p. 10). We will return 
to the principle of beneficence in VR in the following section. 
The principle of non-maleficence can be found in the codes of 
ethical conduct for both the American Psychological Association 
(General Principle A)5 as well as in the British Psychological 
5 http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/
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Society (Principle 2.4). The British Psychological Society offers 
the following recommendation:
Harm to research participants must be avoided. Where 
risks arise as an unavoidable and integral element of 
the research, robust risk assessment and management 
protocols should be developed and complied with. 
Normally, the risk of harm must be no greater than that 
encountered in ordinary life, i.e., participants should not 
be exposed to risks greater than or additional to those to 
which they are exposed in their normal lifestyles (The 
British Psychological Society, 2014, p. 11).
Following this recommendation in the case of VR might 
raise some novel challenges due to the entirely new nature of the 
technology. For instance, a well-known domain of application for 
the principle of non-maleficence has been in clinical trials for 
new pharmacological agents. Although this domain of research 
ethics still faces important and controversial issues (Wendler, 
2012), thinkers in the debate can avail themselves of the history of 
medical technology. In many cases, precedents can be quoted. In 
the case of VR, there is yet no history that we can use as a source 
for insight. On the contrary, what is needed is a rational, ethically 
sound process of precedence-setting.
In its general form, the principle of non-maleficence for VR 
can be expressed as follows:
No experiment should be conducted using virtual reality 
with the foreseeable consequence that it will cause serious 
or lasting harm to a subject.
Although recommending adherence to this principle is noth-
ing new, implementing this principle in VR laboratories may be 
challenging for the following reason. Attempts to apply non-
maleficence in VR can encounter a dilemma of sorts. On the one 
hand, a goal of the research ought to be, as we suggest below, to 
gain a better understanding of the risks posed for individuals 
using VR. For instance, does the duration of immersion pose 
a greater risk for the user? Might some virtual environments 
be more psychologically disturbing than others? VR research 
should seek to answer these and similar questions. In particular, 
open-ended longitudinal studies will be necessary to assess the 
risk of long-term usage for the general population, just like with 
new substances for pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement 
or medical treatments more generally. On the other hand, it 
is difficult to assess these risks without running experiments 
that generate those possible risks, thus raising worries about 
non-maleficence.
A strict adherence to non-maleficence would require avoid-
ing all experiments using virtual environments for which the 
risk is unknown. We suggest that this strict interpretation of 
non-maleficence is not optimal, because substantial ethical 
assessments should always be evidence-based and necessarily 
involve the investigation of greater time-windows and larger 
populations. VR researchers could and should provide a valuable 
service by informing the public and policy makers of the possible 
risks of spending large amounts of time in unregulated virtual 
environments. The principle of non-maleficence should be applied 
in the sense that experiments should not be conducted if the 
outcome involves foreseeable harm to the subjects. On the other 
hand, the same principle implies a sustained striving for rational, 
evidence-based minimization of risks in the more distant future. 
We, therefore, suggest that careful experiments designed with the 
beneficent intention of discovering the psychological impact of 
immersion in VR are ethically permissible.
In order to adhere to the principle of non-maleficence, 
researchers (and ethics committees) will need to utilize their 
knowledge of experimental psychology as well as their knowl-
edge of results specific to VR. The kinds of results sketched 
in Sections “Plasticity in the Human Mind” and “Illusions of 
Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect” will be directly relevant 
for evaluating whether a line of experimentation violates 
non-maleficence. Similarly, the selection of subjects for VR 
experiments must be done with special care. New methods of 
prescreening for individuals with high risk factors must be incre-
mentally developed, and funding for the development of such 
new methodologies needs to be allocated. We, therefore, urge 
careful screening of subjects to minimize the risks of aggravating 
an existing psychological disorder or an undetected psychiatric 
vulnerability (Rizzo et al., 1998; Gregg and Tarrier, 2007). Many 
experiments using VR currently seek to treat existing psychiat-
ric disorders. The screening process for such experiments has 
the goal of selecting subjects who exhibit signs and symptoms of 
an existing condition. The screening process should also include 
exclusion criteria specific to possible risks posed by VR. Ideally, 
the VR research community will seek to establish an empirically 
motivated standard set of exclusion criteria. As we will discuss 
in Section “The Effects of Long-Term Immersion” below, of 
particular concern are vulnerabilities to disorders that could 
potentially become aggravated by prolonged immersion and illu-
sions of embodiment, such as Depersonalization/Derealization 
Disorder (DDD; see American Psychiatric Association (2013), 
DSM-5: 300.14). Standard exclusion criteria may involve, for 
instance, scoring above a particular threshold on scales testing 
for dissociative experiences (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986) or 
depersonalization (Sierra and Berrios, 2000). Of course, there 
may be cases in which experimenters seek to include subjects 
with experiences of dissociation in order to investigate ways 
in which VR might be used to treat the underlying conditions, 
such as treating post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) through 
exposure therapy in VR (Botella et al., 2015). In those special 
cases, it is important to implement alternative exclusion criteria, 
such as Rothbaum et al. (2014), who excluded subjects with a 
history of psychosis, bipolar disorder, and suicide risk.
Informed Consent
The results presented above clearly suggest that VR experiences 
can have lasting psychological impact. This new knowledge about 
the lasting influence of experiences in VR must not be withheld 
from subjects in new VR experiments.
We recommend that informed consent for VR experi-
ments ought to include an explicit statement to the effect 
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that immersive VR can have lasting behavioral influences 
on subjects, and that some of these risks may be presently 
unknown.
Subjects should be made aware of this possibility out of respect 
for their autonomy (as included, for example, in the American 
Psychological Association General Principle D)6. That is, if an 
experiment might alter their behavior without their awareness 
of this alteration, then such an experiment could be seen as a 
threat to the autonomy of the subject. A reasonable way to 
preserve autonomy, we suggest, is simply to inform subjects of 
possible lasting effects. Please again note the principled problem 
that research animals are not able to give informed consent, their 
interest needs to be represented by humans. Also note that we 
are not suggesting that subjects ought to be informed about the 
particular effects that are being investigated in the experiment. 
Thus, our recommendation should not raise the concern that 
informing subjects may compromise researchers’ abilities to test 
for particular behavioral effects.
Practical Applications: False Hope and Beneficence
Another concern has to do with various applications of VR. One of 
many promising applications for VR research is in the treatment 
of disease, damage, and other health-related issues, especially 
mental health.7 For instance, researchers found that immersing 
burn victims in an icy virtual environment can mitigate their 
experience of pain during medical procedures (Hoffman et al., 
2011). Here, we wish to raise some concerns about applications of 
VR. The first concern is that patients may develop false hope with 
regard to clinical applications of VR. The second concern is that 
applications of VR may encounter a tension between beneficence 
and autonomy.
Patients may believe that treatment using VR is better than 
traditional interventions merely due to the fact that it is a new 
technology, or an experimental application of existing tech-
nology. This sense of false hope is known as the “therapeutic 
misconception” in the literature on the ethics of clinical research 
(Appelbaum et al., 1987; Kass et al., 1996; Lidz and Appelbaum, 
2002; Chen et  al., 2003). Researchers using VR for clinical 
research must be aware of established techniques for combating 
the therapeutic misconception in their subjects. For example, 
one established guideline for investigating new clinical applica-
tions is that of “clinical equipoise,” which is the requirement that 
there be genuine uncertainty in the medical community as to the 
best form of treatment (Freedman, 1987). It is important that 
researchers communicate their own sense of this uncertainty in 
a clear manner to volunteer subjects. Similarly, as Chen et  al. 
(2003) note, physicians who have a lasting relationship with their 
patients may be better suited to form a judgment as to whether 
the patient is motivated by a clear understanding of the nature 
6 http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/
7 VR has been used to treat a wide range of mental health issues, including eat-
ing disorders (Ferrer-Garcia et al., 2015), acrophobia (Emmelkamp et al., 2001), 
agoraphobia (Botella et al., 2004), arachnophobia (Carlin et al., 1997), and PTSD 
(Rothbaum et al., 2001). See Parsons and Rizzo (2008) for a meta-analysis of these 
kinds of treatment.
of the research, rather than motivated by false hope or even 
desperation.
VR researchers aiming at new clinical applications should 
therefore work slowly and carefully, in close collaboration 
with physicians who may be better situated to make 
informed judgments about the suitability of particular 
patients for new trials.
Therapeutic and clinical applications should be investigated 
only in the presence of certified medical personnel.
Another relevant concern here is the way in which the general 
public keeps informed of new developments in science through the 
popular media. Members of the general public with less interest in 
science may have a more difficult time gleaning scientific knowl-
edge from the media than those with more interest (Takahashi 
and Tandoc, 2015). When considering their responsibility as 
scientists to communicate new results to the public (Fischhoff, 
2013; Kueffer and Larson, 2014), VR researchers working in clini-
cal applications must be careful to avoid language that might give 
false hope to patients.
We should also note here that there are other practical concerns 
about the use of VR for medical interventions. For instance, once 
the technology is available for patients to use, who will pay for 
it? Should medical insurance pay for HMDs and new software? 
How do we achieve distributive justice and avoid a situation where 
only privileged members of society benefit from technological 
advances? We make no recommendation here, but flag this ques-
tion as something that needs to be considered by policy makers. 
Similarly, HMDs, CAVE immersive displays, and motion-tracking 
technology may have to be reclassified as medical devices.
One risk when performing the research necessary for develop-
ing such applications is that the patients involved may develop 
a false sense of hope due to the non-traditional nature of the 
intervention. As this kind of research progresses, scientists must 
continue to be honest with patients so as not to generate false 
hope. There is also an overlap between media ethics and the ethics 
of VR technology: a related example is that many of the early 
experiments on full-body illusions (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager 
et al., 2007) have been falsely overreported as creating full-blown 
“out-of-body experiences” (Metzinger, 2003, 2009a,b), and scien-
tists have perhaps not done enough to correct this misrepresenta-
tion of their own work in the media.8 While incremental progress 
has clearly been made, large parts of the public still falsely believe 
that scientists “have created OBEs in the lab.”
Overall, scientists and the media need to be clear and 
honest with the public about scientific progress, especially 
in the area of using VR for medical treatment.
The second concern about applications of VR has to do with 
the well-known tension between autonomy and beneficence in 
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applied ethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013: Chapter 6). As 
the results surveyed in the first part of this article suggest, VR ena-
bles a powerful form of non-invasive psychological manipulation. 
One obvious application of VR, then, would be to perform such 
manipulations in order to bring about desirable mental states and 
behavioral dispositions in subjects. Indeed, early experiments in 
VR have done just that, making subjects willing to save more 
for their retirement (Hershfield et al., 2011), perform better on 
tests for implicit racial bias (Peck et al., 2013), and behave in a 
more environmentally conscious manner (Ahn et al., 2014). In 
a paternalistic spirit, such as that of the UK Behavioral Insights 
Team, one might urge that beneficent VR applications such as 
these should be put in place among the general populace, perhaps 
as a new form of “public service announcement” for the twenty-
first century. Here, we wish to note that doing so may generate 
another case of conflict between beneficence and autonomy. If 
individuals do not seek to alter their psychological profile in the 
ways intended by the beneficent VR interventions, then such 
interventions may be considered a violation of their autonomy.
Dual Use
Dual use is a well-known problem in research ethics and the ethics 
of technology, especially in the life sciences (Miller and Selgelid, 
2008). Here, we use it to refer to the fact that technology can be 
used for something other than its intended purpose, in particular 
to military applications. In the context of VR technology, one 
will immediately think not only of drone warfare, teleoperated 
weapon systems, or “virtual suicide attacks,” but also of interroga-
tion procedures and torture. It is not in the power of the scientists 
and engineers who develop the technology to police its use, but 
we can raise awareness about potential misuses of the technology 
as a way of contributing to precautionary steps.
Here is an example. One possible application of VR would be 
to rehabilitate violent offenders by immersing them in a virtual 
environment that induces a strong sense of empathy for their 
victims. We see no problem at all with voluntary participation 
in such a promising use of the technology. But it is foreseeable 
that governments and penal systems adopt mandatory treatment 
using similar techniques, calling to mind Anthony Burgess’ A 
Clockwork Orange. We will not comment on the moral acceptabil-
ity of such a practice, noting that the details of implementation 
may be an important – and more controllable – unknown factor.
Virtual embodiment constitutes historically new form of act-
ing. Metzinger (2013c) introduced the notion of a “PSM-action” to 
describe this new element more precisely. PSM-actions are those 
actions in which a human being exclusively uses the conscious 
self-model in her brain to initiate an action, causally bypassing 
the non-neural body (as in Figure 5). Of course, there will have to 
be feedback loops for complex actions, for instance, when seeing 
through the camera eyes of a robot, perhaps adjusting a grasping 
movement in real-time (which is still far from possible today). But 
the relevant causal starting point of the entire action is no longer 
the body made of flesh and bones, but the conscious self-model 
in our brain. We simulate an action in the self-model, in the inner 
image of our body, and a machine performs it. PSM-actions are 
almost purely “mental,” put they may have far-reaching causal 
consequences in the real world, for example, in combat situations. 
As the embodiment in avatars and physical robots may be func-
tionally shallow and may provide only weaker and less stable forms 
of self-control (for example, with regard to spontaneously arising 
aggressive fantasies, see Metzinger, 2013c for an example), it is 
not clear how such PSM-actions mediated via brain–computer 
interfaces should be assessed in terms of accountability and ethical 
responsibility.9
Just as VR can be used to increase empathy, it can conceiv-
ably be used to decrease empathy. Doing so would have obvious 
military applications in training soldiers to have less empathy for 
enemy combatants, to feel no remorse about doing violence. We 
will not go further into the difficult issues regarding the use of 
new technology in warfare, but we note this possible alternative 
application of the technology. Apart from increasing or decreas-
ing empathy, the power of VR to induce particular kinds of emo-
tions could be used deliberately to cause suffering. Conceivably, 
the suffering could be so extreme as to be considered torture. 
Because of the transparency of the emotional layers in the human 
self-model (Metzinger, 2003), it will be experienced as real, even 
if it is accompanied by cognitive-level insight into the nature of 
the overall situation. Powerful emotional responses occur even 
when subjects are aware of the fact that they are in a virtual 
environment (Meehan et al., 2002).
Torture in a virtual environment is still torture. The fact 
that one’s suffering occurs while one is immersed in a 
virtual environment does not mitigate the suffering itself.
VR Research and the Internet
A final concern for the research ethics portion of this article 
has to do with the use of the internet in conjunction with VR 
research. For instance, scientists may wish to observe the pat-
terns of behavior for users under particular conditions. It is clear 
that the internet will play a main role in the adoption of VR for 
personal use. Users will be able to inhabit virtual environments 
with other users through their internet connections, and perhaps 
enjoy new forms of avatar-based intersubjectivity. As O’Brolcháin 
et al. (2016) suggest, we will soon see a convergence of VR with 
online social networks. The overall ethical risks of this imminent 
development have been covered in detail by O’Brolcháin et  al. 
(2016); in this section, we will incorporate and expand on their 
discussion with a focus on questions of research ethics.
There is a sizable body of literature covering the main issues 
of internet research ethics (Ess and Association of Internet 
Researchers Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Buchanan and 
9 It is important to note that teleoperated weapon systems are used in an illegal 
manner today, and it would not be rational to assume that the introduction of 
military VR-technology in combination with brain–computer interfaces could lead 
to a change in this deplorable situation. With German support, the United States 
of America execute citizens of and in other sovereign states (e.g., Yemen, Somalia, 
Pakistan) without charge, trial, or final judgment (the so-called “extrajudicial kill-
ings”), thereby violating international law (under which lethal force may be used 
outside armed conflict zones only as a last resort to prevent imminent threats; 
see Melzer, 2008 for background and discussion) as well as national law, human 
rights, and humanitarian laws. The potential for further illegal or unethical military 
applications of VR is high, and one of our major concerns.
FiGURe 5 | “PSM-actions”: a test subject lies in a nuclear magnetic resonance tomograph at the weizmann institute in israel. With the aid of data 
goggles he sees an avatar, also lying in a scanner. The goal is to create the illusion that he is embodied in this avatar. The test subject’s motor imagery is classified 
and translated into movement commands, setting the avatar in motion. After a training phase, test subjects were able to control a remote robot in France “directly 
with their minds” via the Internet, while they were able to see the environment in France through the robot’s camera eyes. (Image used with kind permission from 
Doron Friedman and Ori Cohen, cf. Cohen et al., 2014.)
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Ess, 2008, 2009). Here, we address the following question: 
how should these existing issues of internet research ethics be 
approached for cases of internet research with the use of VR? The 
two main issues that we will cover here are privacy and obtaining 
informed consent. We will consider the internet both as a tool and 
a venue for research (Buchanan and Zimmer, 2015), while noting 
that virtual environments may place pressure on the distinction 
between internet as research tool and internet as research venue.
Let us begin with the question of privacy. It is widely accepted 
that researchers have an ethical obligation to treat confidentially 
any information that may be used to identify their subjects (see, 
for example, European Commission, 2013, p. 12). This obliga-
tion is based on the general right to privacy outside of a research 
context (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 12, 1948; 
European Commission Directive 95/46/EC). Practicing this 
confidentiality may involve, for instance, erasing, or “scrubbing,” 
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personally identifiable information from a data set (O’Rourke, 
2007; Rothstein, 2010).
As O’Brolcháin et  al. note, immersive virtual environments 
will involve the recording of new kinds of personal information, 
such as “eye-movements, emotions, and real-time reactions” 
(2015, p. 8). We would like to add that immersive VR could even-
tually incorporate motion capture technology in order to record 
the details of users’ bodily movements for the purpose of, for 
example, representing their avatar as moving in a similar fashion. 
Although implementing this scenario may be beyond the capa-
bilities of the forthcoming commercial hardware, it is plausible 
and rational to assume that the technology may evolve quickly to 
include such options. Data regarding the kinematics of users will 
be useful for researchers from a range of disciplines, especially 
those interested in embodied cognition (Shapiro, 2014). On the 
plausible assumption that one’s kinematics is very closely related 
to one’s personality and the deep functional structure of bodily 
self-consciousness – only your body moves in precisely this man-
ner – there will a highly individual “kinematic fingerprint.” This 
kind of data collection presents a special threat to privacy.
O’Brolcháin et al. (2016) recommend protecting the privacy 
for users of online virtual environments through legislation and 
through incentives to develop new ways of protecting privacy. As 
a complement to these recommendations, we wish to highlight 
the threat to privacy created by motion capture technology. 
Unlike eye-movements and emotional reactions, one’s kinemat-
ics may be uniquely connected with one’s identity, as indicated 
above. Researchers collecting such data must be aware of its 
sensitive nature and the dangers of its misuse. In addition, com-
mercial providers of cloud-based VR-technology will frequently 
have an interest of “harvesting,” storing, and analyzing such data 
and users should be informed about such possibilities and give 
explicit consent to them.
A second main concern in the ethics of internet research is 
that of informed consent. In contrast to informed consent for 
traditional face-to-face experiments, internet researchers may 
obtain consent by having subjects click “I agree” after being 
presented with the relevant documentation. There are a number 
of concerns and challenges regarding the practice of gaining 
consent for research using the internet as a venue (Buchanan and 
Zimmer, 2015, see section Privacy, below), including, of course, 
the fact that actually reading internet privacy policies before 
accepting them would take far more time than we are willing to 
allocate – on one estimate, it would take each of us 244 h per year 
(McDonald and Cranor, 2008).
We suggest that immersive VR will add further complications 
to these existing issues due to its manipulation of bodily location 
and its dissolution of boundaries between the real and the virtual. 
Consider that entering a new internet venue, say a chatroom or a 
forum, involves a fairly well-defined threshold at which informed 
consent can be requested before one enters the venue. Due to 
the centrality of the URL for using the web, one’s own location 
in cyberspace is fairly easy to track. With VR, by contrast, it is 
foreseeable that one’s movement through various virtual environ-
ments will be controlled by one’s bodily movements, through 
facial gestures, or simply by the trajectory of visual attention in 
a way unlike internet navigation using a mouse, keyboard, and 
navigation bar. In addition, and more interesting, it is also fore-
seeable that HMDs will incorporate simultaneous combinations 
of augmented, substitutional, and VR, with the user being able to 
toggle between elements of the three. Such a situation would add 
ambiguity, and perhaps confusion, for attempts to determine the 
user’s location in cyberspace. This ambiguity raises the likelihood 
that users may give consent for data collection in a particular 
virtual context but then become unaware of the continued data 
collection as the user changes context. Such a situation might 
occur if users of HMDs are able to toggle between, say, an entirely 
virtual gaming environment, a look out of the window to the busy 
street below presented through augmented reality, and a family 
gathering hundreds of kilometers away using substitutional real-
ity through an omni-directional camera set up at the party. This 
worry can be addressed by giving users continuous reminders 
(after, of course, they have given informed consent) that their 
behavior is being recorded for research purposes. Perhaps the 
visual display could include a small symbol for the duration of 
the time in which data are being collected.
We leave the implementational details open, but urge the 
scientific community to take steps to avoid the abuse of 
informed consent with this technology, especially in the 
interest of preserving public trust.
A Note on the Limitations of a Code of Ethics for 
Researchers
We would like to conclude our discussion of the research ethics 
of VR by noting that the proposed (incomplete) code of conduct 
is not intended to be sufficient for guaranteeing ethical research 
in this domain. What we mean here is that following this code 
should not be considered to be a substitute for ethical reasoning 
on the part of researchers, reasoning that must always remain 
sensitive to contextual and implementational details that cannot 
be captured in a general code of conduct. We urge researchers to 
conceive of our recommendations here as an aid in their ongoing 
reflections about the ethical implications and permissibility of 
their own work, and to proactively support us in developing this 
ethics code into more detailed future versions. As we emphasized 
in the beginning of the article, this work is only intended as a 
first list of possible issues in the research ethics of VR and related 
technologies. We intend to update and revise this list continu-
ously as new issues arise, although the venue for future revisions 
is undecided. In any case, we wish to open an invitation for 
constructive input from researchers in this field regarding issues 
that should be added or reformulated.
Scientists must understand that following a code of ethics 
is not the same as being ethical. A domain-specific ethics 
code, however consistent, developed, and fine grained 
future versions of it may be, can never function as a 
substitute for ethical reasoning itself.
Risks for individuals and Society
Now consider possible issues that may arise with widespread 
adoption of VR for personal use. Once the technology available 
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to the general public for entertainment (and other) purposes, 
individuals will have the option of spending extended periods 
of time immersed in VR  –  in a way this is already happening 
with the advent of smartphones, social networks, increasing 
time online, etc. Some of the risks and ethical concerns that we 
have already encountered in the early days of the internet10 will 
reappear, though with the added psychological impact enabled 
by embodiment and a strong sense of presence. We all know that 
internet technology has long ago begun to change our self-models 
and consequently our very own psychological structure. The com-
bination with technologies of virtual and robotic re-embodiment 
may greatly accelerate this development.
For instance, consider the infamous case of virtual rape in 
LambdaMOO, the text-based multi-user dungeon (MUD). In 
that virtual world, a player’s character known as “Mr.Bungle” 
used a “voodoo doll” program to control the actions of other 
characters in the house. He forced them to perform a range of 
sexual acts, some of which are especially disturbing (Dibbell, 
1993). Users of LambdaMOO were outraged, and at least one 
user whose character was a victim of the virtual rape reported 
suffering psychological trauma (ibid.). The relevant point to keep 
in mind here is that this entire virtual transgression occurred in a 
world that was entirely text based. We will soon be fully immersed 
in virtual environments, actually embodying – rather than merely 
describing – our avatars. The results sketched above in Section 
“Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect” suggest that 
the psychological impact of full immersion will be great, likely 
far greater than the impact of text-based role-playing. We must 
now take steps in order to help users avoid suffering psychological 
trauma of various kinds. To this end, we will discuss four kinds 
of foreseeable risks:
• long-term immersion;
• neglect of embodied interaction and the physical environment;
• risky content;
• privacy.
We will offer several concrete recommendations for minimiz-
ing all four of these kinds of risks to the general public, a number 
of which call for focused research initiatives.
The Effects of Long-Term Immersion
First, and perhaps most obviously, we simply do not know the 
psychological impact of long-term immersion. So far, scientific 
research using VR has involved only brief periods of immersion, 
typically on the order of minutes rather than hours. Once the 
technology is adopted for personal use, there will be no limits 
on the time users choose to spend immersed. Similarly, most 
research using VR has been conducted using adult subjects. Once 
VR is available for commercial use, young adults and children 
will be able to immerse themselves in virtual environments. The 
risks that we discuss below are especially troublesome for these 
younger users who are not yet psychologically and neurophysi-
ologically fully developed.
10 See Gregory Lastowka, 2010 for a thoughtful treatment of some of the relevant 
issues.
In order to better understand the risks, we recommend 
longitudinal studies, further research into the psychologi-
cal effects of long-term immersion.
Of course, these studies must be conducted according to the 
principles of informed consent, non-maleficence, and benefi-
cence outlined in Section “The Research Ethics of VR.” There 
are several possible risks that can be associated with long-term 
immersion: addiction, manipulation of agency, unnoticed psy-
chological change, mental illness, and lack of what is sometimes 
vaguely called “authenticity” (Metzinger and Hildt, 2011, p. 253). 
The risks that are discovered through longitudinal studies must 
be directly and clearly communicated to users, preferably com-
municated within VR itself.
Psychologists have long expressed concern about internet 
use disorder (Young, 1998), and it is a topic of ongoing research 
(Price, 2011).11 This area of research must now expand in order to 
include concerns about addiction to immersive VR, both online 
and offline. Doing so will require monitoring users who prefer to 
spend long periods of time immersed (see Steinicke and Bruder, 
2014 for a first self-experiment). There are two relevant open 
questions here. First, how might the diagnostic criteria for addic-
tion to VR differ from the established criteria for internet use 
disorder and related conditions? Note that the neurophysiological 
underpinnings of VR addiction may differ from that of internet 
use disorder (Montag and Reuter, 2015) due to the prolonged 
illusion of embodiment created by VR technology, and because 
it implies causal interaction with the low-level mechanisms con-
stituting the UI. Second, can we make use of the recommended 
treatments for internet use disorder for the purpose of helping 
individuals with VR addiction? For instance, Gresle and Lejoyeux 
(2011, p. 92) recommend informing users how much time they 
have spent playing an online game, and including non-player 
characters in the game to urge players to take breaks. It is plausible 
that these strategies would be effective for immersive VR as well, 
but focused research is needed.
A second concern about long-term immersion has to do with 
the fact that immersive VR can manipulate the user’s sense of 
agency (Gallagher, 2005). In order to generate a strong illusion 
of ownership for the virtual body, the VR technology must track 
the self-generated movements of the user’s real body and render 
the virtual body as moving in a similar manner.12 When things are 
working well, users experience an illusion of ownership of the vir-
tual body (the avatar is my body), as well as an illusion of agency 
(I am in control of the avatar). Importantly, the sense of agency in 
VR is always indirect; control of the avatar is always mediated by 
the technology. To be more precise, the virtual body representation 
has been causally coupled with and temporarily embedded into 
the currently active conscious self-model in the user’s brain – it 
is not that some mysterious “self ” leaves the physical body and 
“enters” the avatar, but rather a novel functional configuration in 
11 Internet use disorder is listed as an area requiring further research in the DSM-5, 
but it is not (yet) an official disorder according to the manual.
12 If the real body is not in motion, then co-location of the virtual body with the real 
body as seen from the first-person perspective can be sufficient for the illusion of 
ownership (Maselli and Slater, 2013).
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which two body representations dynamically interact with each 
other. However, the causal loop in principle enables bidirectional 
forms of control, or even unnoticed involuntary influence. The 
fact that the user’s sense of agency in VR is always continuously 
maintained by the technology is an important one for at least two 
reasons. First, the technology could be used to manipulate users’ 
sense of agency. Second, as we discuss in the general context of 
mental health below, long-term immersion could cause low-level, 
initially unnoticeable psychological disturbances involving a loss 
of the sense of agency for one’s physical body.
VR technology could manipulate users’ sense of agency by 
creating a false sense of agency for movements of the avatar that 
do not correspond to the actual body movements of the user. The 
same could be true for “social hallucinations,” i.e., the creation 
of the robust subjective impression of ongoing social agency, of 
engaging in a real, embodied form of social interaction, which, 
however, in reality is only interaction with an unconscious 
AI or with complex software controlling the simulated social 
behavior of an avatar. Using only a computer screen, a modified 
mouse, and headphones, a false sense of agency was created 
in Daniel Wegner’s well-known “I Spy” experiments (Wegner 
and Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2002). In those experiments, 
subjects reported that they felt themselves to be in control of 
a cursor selecting an icon on a computer screen when in fact 
the cursor was being controlled by someone else. The illusion 
of control was induced by auditory priming –  subjects heard 
a word through headphones that had a semantic association 
with the icon that was subsequently selected by the cursor. It is 
reasonable to think that Wegner’s method can be implemented 
rather easily in VR. While immersed in VR, subjects can receive 
continuous audio and visual cues intended to influence their 
psychological states. Future experimental work can determine 
the conditions under which subjects will experience a sense 
of agency for movements of the avatar that deviate from the 
subject’s actual body movements (as during an OBE or in the 
dream state, see Kannape et al., 2010 for an empirical study). 
Important parameters here will likely be the timing of the false 
movement, the degree to which the false movement deviates 
from the actual position of the body, and the context of the 
movement within the virtual environment (including, for 
instance, the attentional state of the subject).
Creating a false sense of agency in VR is a clear violation of 
the user’s autonomy, a violation that becomes especially worri-
some as users spend longer and longer periods of time immersed. 
Here, we will not insist that all cases of violating autonomy in 
this manner are ethically impermissible, noting that some such 
violations may be subtle and beneficent, a kind of virtual “nudge” 
in the right direction (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). In addition, 
human beings often willfully choose to decrease their autonomy, 
as in drinking alcohol or playing games. But we do claim that 
creating a false sense of agency in VR is an unacceptable violation 
of individual autonomy when it is non-beneficent, such as when 
it is done out of avarice, for example. Manipulating the sense of 
agency for users in VR is a topic that deserves attention from 
regulatory agencies.
A third concern that we wish to raise about long-term immer-
sion is that of risks for mental health. As stated above, we simply 
do not know whether long-term immersion poses a threat for 
mental health. Future research ought to investigate whether fac-
tors such as the duration of immersion, the content of the virtual 
environment (including the user’s own avatar or the way in which 
the software controls the automatic behavior, facial gestures, or 
gaze of other avatars), and the user’s pre-existing psychological 
profile might have lasting negative effects on the mental health 
of users. As mentioned above (see Ethical Experimentation), we 
suspect that heavy use of VR might trigger symptoms associated 
with Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder (DSM-5 300.14). 
Overall, the disorder can be characterized as having chronic feel-
ings or sensations of unreality. In the case of depersonalization, 
individuals experience an unreality of the bodily self, and in the 
case of derealization, individuals experience the external world 
as unreal. For instance, those suffering from the disorder report 
feeling as if they are automata (loss of the sense of agency), and 
feeling as if they are living in a dream (see Simeon and Abugel, 
2009 for illustrative reports from individuals suffering from 
depersonalization).13 Note that Depersonalization/Derealization 
Disorder involves feelings of unreality but not delusions of unre-
ality, there is a dissociation of the low-level phenomenology of 
“realness” from high-level cognition. That is, someone suffering 
from depersonalization may lose the sense of agency, but will not 
thereby form the false belief that they are no longer in control of 
their own actions.
Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder is relevant for 
us here because VR technology manipulates the psychological 
mechanisms involved in generating experiences of “realness,” 
mechanisms similar or identical to those that go awry for those 
suffering from the disorder. Even though users of VR do not believe 
that the virtual environment is real, or that their avatar’s body is 
really their own, the technology is effective because it generates 
illusory feelings as if the virtual world is real (recall the virtual pit 
from Section “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect” 
above). What counts is the variable degree of transparency or 
opacity of the user’s own conscious representations (Metzinger, 
2003). Our concern is that long-term immersion could cause 
damage to the neural mechanisms that create the feeling of reality, 
of being in immediate contact with the world and one’s own body. 
Heavy users of VR may begin to experience the real world and 
their real bodies as unreal, effectively shifting their sense of reality 
exclusively to the virtual environment.14 We recommend focused 
longitudinal studies on the impact on mental health of long-term 
immersion in VR. These studies should especially investigate 
risks for dissociative disorders, such as Depersonalization/
Derealization Disorder.
13 There is a sizeable literature on depersonalization/derealization. Some of the 
central works include Steinberg and Schnall, 2001; Radovic and Radovic, 2002; 
Simeon and Abugel, 2009; Sierra, 2012.
14 We should be clear here that we are only speculating about a possible causal 
connection between long-term immersion and experiences of depersonalization/
derealization. The etiology of the disorder is still not well understood. It is well-
known that episodes of depersonalization/derealization can be triggered by stress, 
panic attacks, and the use of some drugs (Simeon, 2004). One prominent theory 
suggests that chronic depersonalization/derealization may be caused by childhood 
trauma (ibid.), though see Marshall et al. (2000).
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A final concern for long-term immersion stems from the fact 
that some may consider experiences in the virtual environment to 
be “inauthentic,” because those experiences are artificially gener-
ated. This concern may remind some readers of Robert Nozick’s 
well-known thought experiment about an “Experience Machine” 
that can provide users with any experience they desire (Nozick, 
1974, p. 42–45). Nozick uses the thought experiment to raise a 
problem for utilitarianism, urging his readers to consider reasons 
why one might not wish to “plug-in” to the machine, claiming 
that “something matters to us in addition to experience” (Nozick, 
1974, p. 44). The interesting question, of course, now becomes 
what would happen if this “additional something” can be added 
to the experience itself, for example by advanced VR-technology 
creating the phenomenal quality of “authenticity,” of direct refer-
ence to something “meaningful,” for example by a more robust 
version of naïve realism on the level of subjective experience 
itself or by manipulation of the user’s emotional self-model. 
While Nozick suggests that many of us would not wish to plug-
in to the experience machine for the reason just stated, recent 
work by Felipe de Brigard suggests otherwise. De Brigard (2010) 
presented students with several variations on the thought experi-
ment all with an important twist on Nozick’s original version. In 
de Brigard’s version, we are told that we are already plugged-in 
to an experience machine and we are asked if we would like to 
unplug in order to return to our “real” lives. Many of de Brigard’s 
students replied that they would not wish to unplug, leading de 
Brigard to suggest that our reactions to the thought experiment 
are influenced more by the status quo bias (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988) than by our valuing of something more than 
experience. It is the status quo bias, de Brigard suggests, that gives 
us pause about plugging-in to the machine (in Nozick’s version of 
the thought experiment) just as it is the status quo bias that gives 
us pause about unplugging (in de Brigard’s version).
Overall, de Brigard’s results offer initial reasons to be skeptical 
about Nozick’s supposition that we would not plug-in because we 
value factors beyond experience alone. Even with this skepticism, 
though, many of us may still feel that there is something false, 
“inauthentic,” or undesirable about living large portions of one’s 
life in an entirely artificial environment, such as VR. Apart from 
the dubious essentialist metaphysics lurking behind the vague 
and sometimes ideologically charged notion of an “authentic self,” 
it is important to note how such intuitions are historically plastic 
and culturally embedded: they may well change over time as 
larger parts of the population begin to use advanced forms of VR 
technology. As an example, please note how already today we find 
a considerable number of people who are not able to grasp the 
difference between “friendship” and “friendship on Facebook” 
any more. Fully engaging with the issue of losing “authenticity” 
in virtual environments would likely require entering into some 
deep philosophical waters, and we are unable to do so here, though 
we will touch on some of the relevant issues below. Apart from the 
deeper philosophical issues, there is one important point that we 
wish to make before moving on.
The point has to do with the way in which we imagine the 
possibilities of VR for personal use. One reason behind an asser-
tion that long-term immersion would be an inauthentic way of 
spending one’s time is that one might assume that the content of 
immersive VR would be unedifying, making people more shallow 
as they retreat from society in favor of an artificial social world 
in which their decisions are made for them. Brolcháin et al. raise 
this sort of concern:
With little exposure to “higher” culture, to great works 
of art and literature; and without the skills (and maybe 
the attention spans) to enjoy them; people would be less 
able to engage with the world at a deep level. People 
without exposure to great works and ideas might find 
that [their] inner lives are shaped to a large degree 
by market-led cultural products rather than works of 
depth and profundity. (2015, p. 20)
We agree that such a scenario would be undesirable, but wish 
to counterbalance this concern by reminding readers that it is 
not unique to VR. It is a concern that can be applied in various 
degrees to other media technology as well, going all the way back 
to worries about the written word in Plato (Phaedrus 274d–275e). 
The printing press, for example, can enable one to disseminate 
great works of literature, but it can also enable the dissemination 
of vulgarity – and it certainly changed our minds. Readers with 
vulgar tastes can “immerse” themselves as they wish. The same 
goes for photography and motion pictures. The important point 
is as follows. There is no reason to doubt that works of great depth 
and profundity can be produced by artists who choose VR as their 
medium. Just as film emerged as a new predominant art form in 
the twentieth century, so might VR in the twenty-first century. We 
predict that immersive VR-technology will gradually lead to the 
emergence of completely new forms of art (or even architecture, 
see Pasqualini et al., 2013), which may be hard to conceive today, 
but which will certainly have cultural consequences, perhaps 
even in our understanding what an artistic subject and esthetic 
subjectivity really are.
Neglect of Others and the Physical Environment
As users spend increasing time in virtual environments, there 
is also a risk of their neglecting their own bodies and physical 
environments – just as for many people today posing and engag-
ing in disembodied social interactions via their Facebook account 
has become more important than what was called “real life” in the 
past. In extreme cases, individuals refuse to leave their homes for 
extended periods of time, behavior categorized as “Hikikomori” 
by the Japanese Ministry of Health. VR will enable us to interact 
with each other in new ways, not through disembodied interac-
tion, as in the texts, images, and videos of current social media, 
but rather through what we have called the illusion of embodi-
ment. We will interact with other avatars while embodied in our 
own avatars. Or perhaps we will use augmented reality through 
omni-directional cameras that allow us to enjoy the illusion of 
being in the presence of someone who is far away in space and/
or time. To put it more provocatively, we may soon, as Norbert 
Wiener anticipated many years ago, have the ability to “telegraph” 
human beings (Wiener, 1954, p. 103–104). Telepresence is likely 
to become a much more accessible, immediate, comprehensive, 
and embodied experience.
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Our general recommendation on this theme is for focused 
research into the following question: What, if anything, 
is lost in cases of social interactions that are mediated 
using advanced telepresence in VR? If such losses were 
unnoticed, what negative effects for the human self-model 
could be expected?
This question has been a major theme in some of Hubert 
Dreyfus’ work on the philosophy of technology. Dreyfus has 
emphasized that mediating technologies may not capture 
something of what is important for real-time interactions in the 
flesh, what, following Merleau-Ponty, he calls “intercorporeal-
ity” (Dreyfus, 2001, p. 57). When we are not present in the 
flesh with others, the context and mood of a situation may be 
difficult to appreciate – if only because the bandwidth and the 
resolution of our internal models are much lower. Perhaps more 
importantly, there is a concern that mediating technologies will 
not allow us to pick up on all of the subtle bodily cues that 
appear to play a major role in social communication through 
unconscious entrainment (Frith and Frith, 2007), cues that 
involve ongoing embodied interaction (Gallagher, 2008; de 
Jaegher et al., 2010).
In addition to the concerns about losing embodied signaling 
for communication, we might also consider what is lost from 
the sense modalities that are not (yet) integrated into VR. As 
Sherry Turkle puts it, when these kinds of technology “keep 
grandparents from making several-thousand-mile treks to see 
their grandchildren in person (and there is already evidence 
that they do), children will be denied something precious: the 
starchy feel of a grandmother’s apron, the smell of her perfume 
up close, and the taste of her cooking” (Harmon, 2008; Turkle, 
2011, p. 342). Advances in technology could conceivably address 
Turkle’s point about other perceptual modalities, but there 
remains a question about what may be lost even if we can create 
virtual content for other sense modalities.15 One recent finding 
that should raise concern here is that depression is more likely in 
older adults who have less social contact in person regardless of 
their amount of telephone, written, and email contact (Teo et al., 
2015). Apart from this troubling finding, even if the technology 
eventually enables rich social interaction through telepresence, 
the concern remains that heavy use of such technology will lead 
to neglect or even animosity toward one’s actual physical and 
social environment. The recurring tragedies of parents with 
“gamer rage” who have injured and killed their children because 
15 All of these concerns bring up the question of whether the problem is merely a 
shortcoming in the technology, or something more fundamental. That is, should 
we only be concerned about losing important information through mediated inter-
actions, information such as bodily cues and tactile sensations? If so, then advances 
in technology can conceivably address that concern. Or is there something else 
that is lost when not present in the flesh with others? It seems that thinkers such 
as Dreyfus wish to suggest that there is something else that is lost when we lose 
“intercorporeality,” something that cannot be captured with better and better tech-
nology. Still, it remains somewhat difficult to articulate what that “something else” 
might be. One possibility is that social interactions that are mediated by advanced 
technology lose some form of “authenticity” as discussed above. It is also worth 
noting that our epistemic limitations may be relevant: in the case of VR, we do not 
yet know the way in which social interaction will be altered.
the children disrupt their playing indicate that this concern is 
valid and serious.16
Clark (2003) takes a notably different approach to these kinds 
of issues, raising the point that, instead of treating VR and related 
technologies as a replacement for in-the-flesh interaction, we 
should think of them as providing opportunities for new and 
perhaps enhanced modes of human interaction. Rather than 
unsatisfactory reproductions of familiar modes of interaction, the 
technology should be developed with an eye toward “expanding 
and reinventing our sense of body and action” (2003, p. 111). 
Consider, for example, using a combination of substitutional and 
augmented reality to see a representation of some of the physi-
ological states of your partner who is many miles away – such 
as a soft flash over the body in synchrony with the heartbeat (as 
in Aspell et  al., 2013). That and similar uses of the technology 
could plausibly enhance embodied (though mediated) social 
interaction. As with many other topics addressed here, future 
research will be crucial for our understanding of which uses of the 
technology will be best for enabling positive forms of (mediated) 
social interaction.
Clark’s recommendation that we use the technology as an 
enhancer rather than a replacement does have some appeal. 
However, what counts as an “enhancement,” and what as therapy 
or mere life-style decision, has been a topic of ethical debates for 
a long time, for instance, in assessing the correct use of phar-
maceutical cognitive enhancement (Metzinger and Hildt, 2011; 
Metzinger, 2012). We should also note that his recommendation 
may not entirely address the concerns raised by Dreyfus, Turkle, 
and others. The foreseeable problem is that the general public sim-
ply will not share Clark’s vision, choosing to use the technology 
as a de facto replacement for traditional modes of interaction (as 
Turkle notes in the passage above). Are “Facebook-friendships” 
social enhancements or social disabilities? In such a situation, we 
must remain mindful of what may be lost, especially when the 
technology may encourage less frequent “in-the-flesh” visits to 
the infirm and immobile.
We wish to close this discussion of the ways in which VR might 
attenuate our contact with others and with our physical environ-
ments by revisiting a point briefly made in the previous section 
on a loss of authenticity during long-term immersion. As noted 
above in the discussion of Nozick’s experience machine, many 
readers might have the intuition that spending long periods of 
time in virtual environments is “somehow inauthentic.” Yet, what 
counts for the applied ethics of VR are not intuitions, but rather 
rational arguments and empirical evidence. We would like to note 
that a likely relevant factor here may be whether those long peri-
ods of immersion involve forms of intersubjective engagement 
with others that are subjectively experienced as meaningful, and 
how this experience is integrated into our culture. Along these 
lines, one may suggest that the artificial nature of the virtual 
environment is not as important compared to whether or not the 
environment affords intersubjective engagement experienced as 
meaningful (see Bostrom, 2003, p. 245–55 and Chalmers, 2005 
16 For a list of examples, see: http://movingtolearn.ca/2013/gamer-rage-child-
abuse-a-growing-problem-deserving-our-attention (retrieved 1 December 2015).
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for similar ideas). This, of course, opens the possibility that 
ultimately shallow or even largely meaningless social interac-
tions (once again, think of today’s Facebook-“friendships” and 
“likes”) are experienced as substantial by users who are really only 
overwhelmed by the possibilities of future VR-technology, and 
which are subsequently described as meaningful. A shallow form 
of social interaction could then become culturally assimilated 
and thereby “normalized” (Metzinger and Hildt, 2011, p. 247). 
Normalization is a complex sociocultural process by which certain 
new norms become accepted in societal practice, a process that is 
often mediated by the availability of new technologies, a process 
that changes our very own minds and which, therefore, carries 
the risk of unnoticed self-deception. Here, we cannot explore this 
rich (and controversial) philosophical territory, but note that it 
may be relevant for grappling with the worry of “inauthenticity” 
in virtual environments.
Risky Content
Another main concern for users of VR is that of virtual content. 
One might begin with the general rule of thumb that red lines 
not to be crossed in reality should be the default red lines in VR. 
One obvious problem, though, is that users will almost certainly 
seek out VR as a way of crossing red lines with impunity. A 
second possible problem is that this rule of thumb would make 
VR even more subjectively real. One main issue here is whether 
some particular kinds of content in VR should be discouraged 
in various ways. Obvious candidates for such content would be 
sex (virtual pedophilia, virtual rape) and violence. But there are 
perhaps less obvious kinds of content that should be consid-
ered, such as content encouraging and reinforcing undesirable 
personality traits, including those identified as the “dark triad” 
(Paulus and Williams, 2002). The dark triad refers to narcissism, 
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Individuals may find it 
appealing to spend time in virtual worlds designed to reward 
characters that exhibit traits associated with the dark triad. For 
example, the MMORPG EVE Online is known for fostering a 
style of play that involves manipulating and deceiving other 
players. The VR version of EVE Online, EVE: Valkyrie, has been 
described as “[u]ndoubtedly the most heavily anticipated virtual 
reality game.”17 Based on some of the empirical results surveyed 
above (see “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect”), 
there is cause for concern about behavioral patterns rewarded in 
immersive games such as EVE: Valkyrie having a lasting influence 
on the psychological profile of users.
Apart from the behaviors encouraged by particular virtual 
environments, there are concerns about the content that can be 
created when users will have the freedom to create and design 
their own avatars. For instance, one goal of our own project VERE 
is to create software that enables untrained users to generate an 
avatar that resembles any human being with fairly little time 
and effort. This application would in principle allow for “body 
swapping,” in which users enter the bodies of others (Petkova and 
Ehrsson, 2008). It is also worth noting that these avatars will be 
17 http://www.craveonline.com/culture/878953-top-10-virtual-reality-games-will-
convince-strap-vr-headset#/slide/10 (retrieved 30 September 2015).
available for use after their human model is dead. Thus, we will be 
able to “resurrect” the dead in VR. The ability to body-swap and 
to interact with the dead in this way may offer great opportunity 
for therapy in the hands of the beneficent, but it could easily lead 
to profound trauma, especially in the hands of characters such as 
Mr. Bungle, mentioned above.
These considerations raise difficult questions about which 
regulatory actions would facilitate the best overall outcome. On 
the one hand, there are good reasons for taking a fairly restric-
tive approach to avatar ownership. On the other hand, there are 
also reasons for allowing individuals maximum freedom in their 
creation and use of avatars. Of course, one’s approach to such 
questions will likely reflect whether one’s political philosophy has 
more paternalistic or libertarian leanings. We will consider the 
reasons for each approach in turn.
A reasonable starting point on this issue would be to treat 
avatars in an analogous manner to personality rights relating 
to the publication of photos. They are public representations of 
persons. Interestingly, societies and legal systems exhibit con-
siderable differences in their underlying moral intuitions here. 
One important conceptual issue here may be determining the 
relevant degree of similarity between an avatar and a human per-
son. Just as many accept the right of an individual to control the 
commercial use of his or her name, image, likeness, one might, 
for example, interpret the “right to my own avatar” a property 
right as opposed to a personal right. Therefore, the validity of 
the right of publicity could be taken to survive the death of the 
biological individual. There will be new questions about the 
ownership (and individuation) of avatars. The likeness between 
a person and their avatar may or may not be an important factor. 
Instead of likeness, we might individuate avatars by a unique 
proper name that can be represented in the virtual space, as in 
many video games. How does one assign an unequivocal iden-
tity to the virtual representation of a body or a person? Could 
there be something like a chassis plate number, a license plate, 
or a “virtual vehicle identification number? (VVIN)? We already 
have digital object identifiers (DOIs) for electronic documents 
and other forms of content, a form of persistent identification, 
with the goal of permanently and unambiguously identifying 
the object with which a given DOI is associated. But what about 
an avatar that is currently used by a human operator, namely 
by functionally and phenomenologically identifying with it? 
Should we dynamically associate a “digital subject identifier” 
(DSI) with it? There will also be questions about whether some 
kinds of virtual activities should be censored. Examples of 
such activities having to do with sex and violence are left to the 
reader’s imagination. Another kind of content worth consider-
ing may be the use of virtual environments for indoctrination 
into extremist groups.
With these initial thoughts in place, now consider the reasons 
for taking a fairly strict regulatory stance on the ownership of 
one’s own avatar. After mentioning the pressure from social 
networks such as Facebook for users to use their real identities, 
O’Brolcháin et al. recommend the development of technologies 
similar to digital watermarking that would ensure “that only the 
genuine owner of an avatar can use it” (2015, p. 22). Would this 
perhaps have to be a “DSI,” as we proposed above? They suggest 
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that such technology would help protect the autonomy and 
privacy of users. Along the same lines, if one were to identify 
strongly with one’s own avatar, the “theft” and use of that avatar 
by another may be extremely disturbing. Importantly, avatar theft 
may also create completely new opportunities for impersonation 
and fraud, for example also using physical robots.
From a more theoretical point of view, we might distinguish 
between internal and external self-models: the internal self-model 
is in the brain of the user, and it is grounded in his or her body 
(Metzinger, 2014), whereas external person- and body-models 
can be created in virtual environments. Here, the specific, histori-
cally new kind of action that needs to be ethically assessed and 
legally regulated takes place when a user identifies with a potential 
external model of the self by dynamically integrating it with the 
internal model of the self already active in his or her brain. The 
core question seems to be what consequences we draw from 
the potential for phenomenological ownership to legal notions of 
ownership. Virtual identification can cause real suffering, and real 
suffering is relevant for the law.
Without denying the value of protecting avatar ownership, we 
would now like to consider two reasons for taking a less restric-
tive, more libertarian, approach. First, implementing control 
over the use of particular avatars may be impractical. So far, 
attempts to curb digital piracy using technology have not been 
very successful, and there is no reason to think that things will 
be different for avatars. In fact, regulation and control may be 
even more difficult with avatars due to questions raised above 
having to do with avatar individuation and degrees of similarity. 
Say a user creates an avatar that is similar but not pixel-for-pixel 
identical to another user’s avatar.18 Where precisely should we 
draw the line between theft and acceptable similarity? Protecting 
avatar ownership might lead to a regulatory quagmire. Even if the 
appearance of the avatar is not highly relevant for ownership, we 
would need to establish a widely accepted alternative method of 
individuation, such as a unique proper name that cannot be easily 
forged. The second reason for taking a less restrictive approach 
would be out of concern for individual creative freedom. As noted 
above, VR holds the promise of being a powerful new artistic 
medium – the creative possibilities are astonishing. The fact that 
regulations on avatar ownership may restrict those possibilities 
must be taken into consideration.
Avatar ownership and individuation will be an important 
issue for regulatory agencies to consider. There are strong 
reasons to place restrictions on the way in which avatars 
can be used, such as protecting the interests and privacy of 
individuals who strongly identify with their own particu-
lar avatar on social networks. On the other hand, these 
restrictions may prove impractical to implement and may 
unnecessarily limit personal creative freedom.
18 The importance of personal identity for moral philosophy is well-known (Parfit, 
1984; Shoemaker, 2014). The considerations here introduce the additional compli-
cation of identity for virtual representations of persons. See Vallor (2010, especially 
pp. 166–167) and Rodogno (2012) for insightful discussions.
Privacy
Privacy is, of course, a major concern with contemporary infor-
mation technology (van den Hoven et al., 2014), and there are 
further concerns about privacy with the foreseeable convergence 
between VR and social networks (O’Brolcháin et al., 2016). Here, 
we wish to offer only a few quick remarks on this topic, noting that 
this issue deserves further attention. Commercial applications 
of virtual environments introduce new possibilities for targeted 
advertising or “neuromarketing,” thus attacking the individual’s 
mental autonomy (Metzinger, 2015). By tracking the details of 
one’s movements in VR, including eye movements, involuntary 
facial gestures, and other indicators of what researchers call low-
level intentions or “motor intentions” (Riva et al., 2011), private 
agencies will be able to acquire details about one’s interests and 
preferences in completely new ways (Coyle and Thorson, 2001). 
If avatars themselves should in the future be used as “humanoid 
interfaces,” consumers can be influenced and manipulated by 
real-time feedback of the avatar’s own facial and eye move-
ments (for example, via automatic and unconscious responses 
in their mirror-neuron system; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). 
Commercials in VR could even feature images of the target audi-
ence himself or herself using the product. The use of big data 
to “nudge” users (“Big Nudging”) combined with VR could have 
long-lasting effects, perhaps producing changes in users’ mental 
mechanisms themselves.
Users ought to be made aware that there is evidence that 
advertising tactics using embodiment technology such 
as VR can have a powerful unconscious influence on 
behavior.
SUMMARY
In this article, we have considered some of the risks that may arise 
with the commercial and research use of VR. We have offered 
some concrete recommendations and noted areas in which 
further ethical deliberation will be required. One main theme of 
the article is that there are several open empirical questions that 
should be urgently addressed in a beneficent research environ-
ment in order to mitigate risks and raise awareness for users of VR 
in the general public. More research is needed. Here, one of our 
main goals was to provide a first set of ethical recommendations 
as a platform for future discussions, a set of normative starting 
points that can be continuously refined and expanded as we go 
along (see Table 1).
Let us end by making one more general point, an observation 
which is of a more philosophical nature. VR is the representation 
of possible worlds and possible selves, with the aim of making 
them appear as real as possible – ideally, by creating a subjective 
sense of “presence” in the user. Interestingly, some of our best 
theories of the human mind and conscious experience itself 
describe it in a very similar way: leading current theories of brain 
dynamics (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015) describe it as 
the constant creation of internal models of the world, predictively 
generating hypotheses – virtual neural representations – about 
TABLe 1 | veRe code of conduct for the ethical use of vR in research and by the general public.
ReCOMMeNDATiONS FOR THe ReSeARCH eTHiCS OF vR
1.  Non-maleficence
 a. No experiment should be conducted using virtual reality with the foreseeable consequence that it will cause involuntary suffering or serious or lasting harm to a 
subject.
 b. A rational, evidence-based identification and minimization of risks (also those pertaining to a more distant future) ought to be a part of research itself.
2.  informed consent
 a. Informed consent for VR experiments ought to include an explicit statement to the effect that immersive VR can have lasting behavioral influences on subjects, and 
that some of these risks may be presently unknown.
 b. Experimental VR research should not be carried out on subjects incapable of informed consent.
3.  Transparency and media ethics
 a. In experimental work developing new clinical applications, researchers should be careful not to create false hopes in patients by repeatedly reminding them of the 
merely experimental nature of the research.
 b. VR researchers aiming at new clinical applications should work in close collaboration with physicians who may be better situated to make informed judgments about 
the suitability of particular patients for new trials.
 c. Scientists and the media need to be clear and honest with the public about scientific progress, and not only in the area of using VR for medical treatment.
 d. In interacting with the media, scientists should cultivate a proactive attitude, especially if they are the first to become aware of novel types of risks through their own 
work. Communication with the public, if needed, should be self-initiated, an act of taking control and acting in advance of a future situation, rather than just reacting.
4.  Dual use
 a. Potential military applications of VR, AR, and SR should be closely monitored by policy makers and funding agencies alike.
 b. Torture in a virtual environment is still torture. The fact that one’s suffering occurs while one is immersed in a virtual environment does not mitigate the suffering itself.
 c. Policy makers should aim at international arrangements among countries to add VR, AR, and SR in a process to harmonize lists of dual-use technologies to be 
controlled.
5.  internet research
 a. The scientific community has to take steps to avoid the abuse of informed consent with this technology, especially in the interest of preserving public trust.
 b. The ability to toggle between VR, AR, and SR may create situations in which users are not able to maintain an understanding of when their informed consent to 
share information is in effect. Users should be repeatedly reminded within VR that they have given informed consent.
6.  The Limitations of a Code of Conduct
 a. Scientists must understand that following a code of ethics is not the same as being ethical. A domain-specific ethics code, however consistent, developed, and 
fine-grained future versions of it may be, can never function as a substitute for ethical reasoning itself.
 b. Such reasoning must be conducted in a way that is sensitive to the contextual and implementational details of particular experimental paradigms, details that cannot 
be captured by a general code of conduct.
ReCOMMeNDATiONS FOR THe USe OF vR BY THe GeNeRAL PUBLiC
1.  Long-term immersion 
 a. Longitudinal studies and further research into the psychological effects of long-term immersion are needed.
 b. Users must be made aware that these studies are seriously limited in that they will, due to ethical constraints, exclude users who may be most vulnerable (such as 
children or those with latent mental illness). Some of these vulnerabilities may be unknown to science and unknown to the users themselves.
2.  increasing virtualization of social interactions – we call for focused research, large longitudinal studies, into the following questions:
 a. What, if anything, is lost in cases of social interactions that are mediated using advanced telepresence in VR?
 b. If such losses were unnoticed, what negative effects for the human self-model could be expected?
3.  Risky content
 a. As compared to the viewing of traditional movies containing graphic violence or pornography, the impact of full immersion settings and the associated risk of users 
suffering psychological trauma will steadily increase as VR technology advances. Users have to be made aware of this possibility.
 b. VR technology holds the potential to create robust social hallucinations, to directly manipulate the sense of agency, to modulate personality traits via identification 
with virtual characters, or to causally interact with deeper levels of self-consciousness (UI-manipulation). Users have to be made aware of this possibility.
 c. Avatar ownership will be an important issue for regulatory agencies to consider. There are strong reasons to place restrictions on the way in which avatars can be 
used, such as protecting the interests and privacy of individuals who strongly identify with their own particular avatar on social networks. On the other hand, these 
restrictions may prove impractical to implement and may unnecessarily limit personal creative freedom. Regulators must strike a rational balance between these 
concerns.
4.  Privacy
 a. Users ought to be made aware that there is evidence that advertising tactics using embodiment technology, such as VR, can have a powerful unconscious influence 
on behavior. For example, a combination of “Big Nudging” strategies (collecting big data for the purposes of nudging the general public) with VR technology could 
have long-lasting effects, which might also affect underlying mental mechanisms themselves.
 b. Data protection: users ought to be made aware of new risks involving surveillance, such as reading out “motor intentions” or a “kinematic fingerprint” during avatar 
use.
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